What Have We Learned About Countering the
PRC’s Influence in Africa?
The U.S.-China rivalry in Africa has evolved into a complex interplay of economic statecraft, ideological competition, and African agency. Over the past two decades, China’s dominance in infrastructure financing and resource extraction has forced the U.S. to rethink its approach, shifting from aid-centric models to public-private partnerships and strategic trade frameworks. This paper expands on granular data, political economy dynamics, and emerging trends to evaluate the efficacy of counterstrategies and future challenges.
China’s trade with Africa surged from $10 billion in 2000 to $192 billion by 2019, with minerals and fuels constituting 68% of African exports. Foreign direct investment (FDI) diversified into manufacturing (15%), services (20%), and construction (25%), while U.S. FDI remained concentrated in extractive industries. By 2023, China’s FDI stock reached $44.4 billion, nearly matching the U.S. at $44.81 billion but with broader sectoral penetration.
Figure 1: China-Africa vs. U.S.-Africa Trade Volume, 2000–2023
| Year | China-Africa Trade (USD bn) | U.S.-Africa Trade (USD bn) |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 10 | 30 |
| 2005 | 40 | 45 |
| 2010 | 120 | 90 |
| 2015 | 180 | 80 |
| 2020 | 190 | 65 |
| 2023 | 192 | 70 |
Figure 1 compares the total annual trade volume (in billions USD) between Africa and China versus Africa and the U.S. from 2000 to 2023. It illustrates China’s rapid rise and overtaking of the U.S. as Africa’s largest trading partner from 2000 to 2023.
Debt Diplomacy and Technology Gaps
- China issued $182 billion in loans to Africa (2000–2024), often secured against natural resources. Zambia’s $6.3 billion debt to China (30% of its external debt) highlights risks of unsustainable borrowing.
- Despite Huawei controlling 70% of Africa’s 4G networks, only 12% of BRI projects included local skills training, limiting technology transfer.
Trade Dynamics: Competing Models and Divergent Outcomes
AGOA’s Mixed Legacy
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) generated a cumulative U.S. trade surplus of $11.24 billion by 2023, but 63% of U.S. imports from Africa were energy products. In contrast, China’s $82.68 billion trade surplus in 2023 derived from machinery (32%) and electronics (28%), underscoring its focus on value-added exports.
Figure 2: U.S. and China Trade Surplus with Africa, 2000–2023
| Year | China Surplus (USD bn) | U.S. Surplus (USD bn) |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 2 | 3 |
| 2005 | 10 | 5 |
| 2010 | 30 | 7 |
| 2015 | 50 | 8 |
| 2020 | 75 | 10 |
| 2023 | 82.7 | 11.2 |
Figure 2 shows the annual trade surplus (in billions USD) that both the U.S. and China have with Africa, highlighting the growing gap in China’s favor over time.
Tariff Wars and Local Displacement
U.S.-China trade tensions redirected Chinese exports to Africa, devastating local industries. Ethiopia’s textile output fell 40% (2021–2024) due to cheap Chinese imports, while U.S. tariffs exempted African minerals like South African platinum, reinforcing extractive dependencies.
U.S. Counterstrategies: Mobilizing Capital and Sectoral Agility
Infrastructure and Green Energy
- The $600 million Lobito Corridor rail project in Angola, co-funded by U.S. and EU entities, challenges China’s BRI-linked transport networks.
- U.S. firms invested $2.5 billion in African solar and EV projects (2023–2025), targeting nations like Kenya seeking alternatives to Chinese coal plants.
Digital Competition
Microsoft and Google secured 35% of Africa’s cloud storage market by 2024 by avoiding China’s data governance mandates, countering Huawei’s 50% market share in telecom infrastructure.
Figure 3: Sectoral Breakdown of Chinese vs. U.S. FDI in Africa, 2023
| Sector | China FDI (%) | U.S. FDI (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Extractives | 30 | 60 |
| Manufacturing | 15 | 8 |
| Services | 20 | 10 |
| Infrastructure | 25 | 12 |
| Technology | 10 | 10 |
Figure 3 compares the sectoral allocation of Chinese and U.S. FDI in Africa (extractives, manufacturing, services, infrastructure, and technology) for 2023, highlighting China’s broader sectoral reach.
Public Sentiment and Dual Engagement
Afrobarometer surveys reveal 63% of Africans view China positively versus 60% for the U.S., reflecting pragmatic acceptance of both powers. Kenya’s 2024 dual agreements-a $1.2 billion Chinese rail loan extension and a $3.8 billion U.S. highway project-exemplify strategic hedging.
UNGA Alignment and Debt Leverage
African nations voted with China 78% of the time in UNGA resolutions (2015–2024), rooted in postcolonial solidarity. However, Zambia’s 2023 debt restructuring talks with China included U.S.-backed transparency clauses, signaling shifting leverage.
Future Prospects: Beyond Preferential Trade
AGOA’s Looming Expiry
If AGOA lapses post-2025, 350,000 African jobs in textiles and agriculture could vanish. Lesotho, where AGOA accounts for 80% of exports, faces acute vulnerability without diversification.
AfCFTA and Infrastructure Gaps
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) requires $3.3 trillion in infrastructure by 2030. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) $1 billion commitment to logistics projects in 2024 addresses gaps left by BRI’s focus on megaprojects.
Strategic Diversification
- The U.S. Department of Energy partnered with DR Congo and Zambia (2024) to secure cobalt and copper supplies, countering China’s 65% global cobalt processing dominance.
- Pfizer’s $500 million investment in Senegalese and South African vaccine production counters China’s “health silk road”.
Conclusion
The recent trajectory of U.S. trade policy-marked by sweeping tariffs, protectionist rhetoric, and the likely expiry of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)-signals a decisive retreat from the tools that once underpinned American influence in Africa. With the U.S. trade-weighted average tariff surging in early 2025, African exporters face unprecedented barriers to the American market, undermining decades of progress made under AGOA. The program, once a cornerstone of U.S. soft power and economic engagement, is now at serious risk of lapsing, with little political momentum for renewal in Washington. This shift is not only economic but also symbolic: it conveys to African governments and populations that the U.S. is deprioritizing their partnership at a time when global competition for influence is intensifying.
The consequences are clear. China’s trade with Africa already dwarfs that of the U.S., and the gap is widening; in 2023, China’s two-way trade with Africa was over four times that of the U.S. The loss of AGOA’s preferences will hit key African industries-textiles, automotive, and agriculture-particularly hard, especially in countries where tens of thousands of jobs depend on duty-free access to the U.S. market. Moreover, the U.S. has scaled back not only trade preferences but also its broader engagement, including development assistance and public diplomacy, further eroding its goodwill and “hearts and minds” capital across the continent.
In this context, the U.S. is poised to lose further ground to China and emerging middle powers, which are deepening their economic and political ties with African states through infrastructure, technology, and investment. Without a fundamental shift-such as the renewal and modernization of AGOA, new incentives for U.S. investment in value-added sectors, and a renewed commitment to partnership-American influence will continue to wane. Africa, meanwhile, is likely to accelerate its own integration and seek partners who demonstrate consistent, long-term commitment. The era of U.S. leadership in Africa is at risk of giving way to a multipolar reality in which Washington’s relevance is no longer assured.
References
- Newlines Institute, “Countering China’s Development Influence,” 2025.
- ISS Africa, “US-China Trade War and Africa’s Manufacturing,” 2025.
- Statista, “U.S. Foreign Direct Investments in Africa,” 2023.
- Brookings Institution, “US-China Engagement in Africa,” 2025.
- Afrobarometer, “US-China Competition as Win-Win,” 2025.
- Financial Times, “US-China Trade War and East Africa,” 2025.
- SWP Berlin, “Africa’s New Trade Deal,” 2025.
- Africa China Reporting Project, “US-China Competition in Africa,” 2024.
- PBS, “U.S. Investment in Africa,” 2024.
- AIB Insights, “Africa’s Position in US-China Rivalry,” 2025.
About the Authors: Together, the authors bring 50 years of experience in trade, investment, and U.S. foreign policy, including 30 years of on-the-ground work in unstable and politically contested environments.